colors/characteristics of war, but can only make an educated guess while understanding the unchanging nature and character under the skin. Only time can reveal the unforeseeable details of future wars, but the architects charged with designing the U.S.
Army capable of fighting and winning the Nation's wars must employ strategic thinking techniques in order to develop robust solutions for assured victory in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) operating environment.
Dr. Phil Conklin defined a wicked, or complex, problem as "one for which each attempt to create a solution changes the understanding of the problem. Designing the future U.S. Army is, undoubtedly, a complex, ill-structured problem. Army planners, requirements managers, force management specialists, and resource managers all work in concert as the Army's architects of change to overcome interlocking issues, satisfy multiple stakeholders, and design an affordable Army with constrained resources. The intent of this analysis is not to provide specific details of the future threat environment or determine how many infantry battalions should be in the 2 Army force structure, but instead to conduct a strategic assessment of the problem and processes involved in designing the future U.S. Army. This comprehensive assessment will examine the numerous complexities of this problem and produce recommended adjustments to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the processes involved with a focus on Total Army Analysis (TAA).
To start, one must frame the problem in order to capture current strategic guidance, factors, and competing requirements that exist or may exist in the uncertain future rather than relying on past force structure solutions as a foundation to build upon.
Secondly, one must consider the current system of systems and all of the existing internal and external pressures that impact the generation of Army force structure.
Finally, with a clear definition of the problem and an understanding of the processes and factors impacting the development of solutions, one can employ creative thinking skills to develop recommended changes to make the current process more efficient and effective in designing a force that best meets all the competing requirements while satisfying published strategic guidance. The strategy formulation model at Figure 1 provides a framework to facilitate a thorough examination of this complex, ill-structured problem in order to better understand current efforts to build the future Army and develop potential improvements/adjustments. 5 This review will work down the center of the model in order to frame the task of designing the Army in terms of ends, ways and means. Subsequently one must consider some of the internal and external forces listed in the flanking columns to better 
ENDS -What Army to Build?
In order to frame today's problem of designing the future Army, one must take a trip back in time and build upon the core national values to "insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," outlined in the Constitution of the United
States. 6 As should be expected, this national purpose is echoed in the current National Although there are several processes the Army uses to develop its future force and capabilities, the TAA process, as depicted in Figure 2 , is the primary way the Army translates published requirements and strategic direction into future force structure. analysis, qualitative analysis, and capabilities based assessment. By examining a few of 6 the key inputs and influences in greater detail, strengths and weaknesses existing in the process may be addressed in order to enhance effectiveness and efficiency.
The first input worthy of consideration in order to better understand the complex problem at hand is the aforementioned broadly defined end of a force that must be capable of going anywhere in the globe and fighting across the full spectrum of operations. The problem solver's primary concern with this guidance is the lack of specific requirements necessary to measure the effectiveness of potential solutions. On the other hand, the architects of change enjoy the freedom provided by this broad strategic direction. Without additional specificity, the strategic direction merely gets the process started and relies on the remaining inputs and influences of the process to shape the final output. More than the other inputs and influences of the TAA process, resource constraints and resource management directives serve as the preeminent contributors to shaping the future Army force structure.
The U.S. Army War College's How the Army Runs describes TAA as a "resource sensitive process" used to develop an "affordable balanced force" that is capable of meeting the requirements defined by published strategic direction and the Combatant Commanders' Army warfighting needs. 12 Unquestionably, the TAA process is designed to react well to changes in the fiscal environment while remaining focused on building an Army to meet numerous demands. AR 71-11 provides flexibility to the routine TAA cycle by acknowledging "compressed TAA excursions for rapid analysis of future requirements may be required due to significant unforeseen changes in Army fiscal resources. soldiers tasked with advising and mentoring Afghan National Security Forces. 15 An SFAB does not exist in the Army's force structure inventory, and many will use its deployment as a champion to transform some number of BCTs into organizations designed specifically for security force assistance missions. In a 2009 Orbis article,
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historian Gian Gentile warned that the Army of the future must be able to fight and should not be built based upon specific mission sets that may be one part of a complex future security environment. 16 Gentile was right. The proven lethality and flexibility of the current BCT structure support his argument and provides a solid foundation for Army architects to respond to current operational requirements and build future force structure. With a better understanding of the adaptability of the current force coupled with the robustness of the TAA process employed to solve the complex problem of building tomorrow's Army, the next logical step is to determine the resources available to accomplish this monumental task.
MEANS -What to Build an Army With?
To this point, this strategic review of building the future Army has yet to address Contributing to the complexity of building the Army are domestic forces and trends that must be examined to better understand the problem and discover potential efficiencies. The first and most influential of these forces can be found in the U.S.
Congress, which is empowered by the Constitution to declare war, raise and support Armies, and make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. 25 The forces impacting the complex problem of building the Army materialize when Congress believes the recommended force structure conflicts with the interests of their constituents. In a recent speech to the National Press Club, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) discussed the "tough decisions to try to build the force of the future"
and acknowledged the influence of Congress on those same decisions:
But nevertheless, there is pressure on the department to retain excess force structure and infrastructure instead of investing in the training and equipment that makes our force agile and flexible and ready. Aircraft, ships, tanks, bases, even those that have outlived their usefulness have a natural political constituency. Readiness does not." Joint Force, which stated, "most importantly, we will put the interest of our Nation before 14 that of any specific group or Service." 31 Although this conflict of interests will not be resolved immediately, it must be considered as a significant influence on the complex problem of designing the Army of tomorrow.
How to Better Build the Army?
Understanding the leadership's desired endstate, the design processes, and the global and domestic factors is critical to the development of a solution. One must now employ creative thinking skills to consider recommended changes to design the Army that best meets all the competing requirements while satisfying published strategic guidance in the most efficient and effective means possible. Additionally, any proposed modifications to refining the strategic direction, improving the processes, understanding the influential forces, or making more efficient use of all available resources will require senior leadership involvement. Recognizing that not even unlimited resources or a complete overhaul of the processes would simplify this problem, the following recommended enhancements focus on reducing the current complexity by exploring the modification of existing processes and relationships in an uncertain fiscal and threat environment in order to develop the Army of the future in the most efficient and effective way possible.
First, Army leaders must make a concerted effort to refine strategic direction in order to avoid any confusion about the desired endstate. In Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense, the SecDef called for "a defense strategy that transitions our Defense enterprise from an emphasis on today's war to preparing for future challenges," while simultaneously directing that "U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scaled, prolonged stability operations." 32 Assuming stability operations will be a mainstay in any future challenges, these two statements from the same strategic direction could be used separately to defend two completely different force structures. The Army's latest position on stability operations is found in the December 2012 version of The U.S. Army Capstone Concept, which calls for the retention of "the knowledge and skills necessary to conduct counterinsurgency or other stability operations in the future." 33 Uncounted dollars and man-hours will be wasted developing solutions that will never meet the desired endstate without a mechanism in place to clarify and communicate the specific intent of strategic direction down to the level of the architects of change. Once again, this clarity will be revealed in multiple forums and publications, but will always depend on the personalities and communication skills of the senior leadership in the Administration, DoD and the Army.
Second, the TAA process must be enhanced. Although TAA is a proven process, it requires the addition of a risk assessment in line with the Army leadership's recognition of the need to "adapt processes to reflect the broader range of requirements." 34 According to AR 1-1 on the Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES), TAA is a computer-aided process that develops a force to meet projected mission requirements within expected end strength and equipment levels. 35 When developing the force in TAA, the architects of change identify Third, the Army leadership must nurture a joint-minded perspective in order to overcome the challenge of self-preserving motivations. The CJCS could not have been any clearer in his guidance to put the interest of our Nation before that of any specific group or Service. 37 The Army's architects of change will be hesitant to rely on the other Services for certain capabilities, but the fact remains that the Army rarely deploys alone.
Looking again in the CJCS strategic guidance, he describes joint interdependence as the Services relying on each other to achieve objectives and create capabilities that do not exist except when combined." 38 An outsider to the process would wonder how anyone could design the Army, Navy or Air Force of the future without considering the capabilities that only exist when two or more Services work together. In the short-term this challenge must be overcome with direction from Army senior leadership to include joint considerations in the TAA process. In the long-term, this issue will require a change in Army culture, defense processes, and the law. As long as the Services each receive their own funding and execute their own force design processes, there will always be inter-Service rivalries and, as a result, an inefficient Joint Force. As a long- since many of the partners' militaries in the region are army-focused. 39 The Army can collect similar requirements from all of the GCC's testimonies and integrated priority list (IPL) submissions, but the Army must ensure these are fully considered during the TAA process. The Reno Report also contained a recommendation for the CSA to chair a 4-Star forum, to include the GCCs, in order to provide his vision of the warfighting capabilities the force must possess. 40 If implemented, the CSA must also provide his priorities in order for the architects of change to design an affordable force that satisfies published strategic direction as efficiently and effectively as possible. These established priorities will not only reduce the problem of un-resourced force structure decisions, but also assist the Army leadership in articulating the resulting risk up the chain of command.
Finally, the CSA and SecArmy must develop a plan to educate and leverage the more powerful players that influence the Army's ability to build a future force structure.
The Army must fully leverage the analytic capabilities of the numerous think tanks and incorporate appropriate findings into their strategic guidance. Instead of focusing on their different agendas or opinions, the Army must focus on the common ground. The same Stimson Center that recommended significant reductions to the Army force structure has a mission statement that includes goals of international peace, building regional security, and reducing weapons of mass destruction and transnational threats. 41 The Army must rely on these common objectives while leveraging these invaluable institutes to educate other players involved in the process. The most important and influential of which, is Congress. In a speech at the National Press Club, the SecDef blamed Congress for "a political system that is depriving the department of the budget certainty needed in order to plan for the future," that was creating a significant risk facing the current defense strategy. 42 The Army leadership must do a better job in educating the members of Congress and the American people on the need for a force structure that meets the national security interests of the United States. In his book, The Masks of War, Carl Builder argued that "significant restructuring will occur only if the society as a whole aligns itself in such a way that Congress must comply with its wishes; and such an alignment is not likely in the absence of a major trauma." 43 In the absence of a major trauma upon the nation, the Army must continue to build relationships with the most influential players, friendly or not, in order to bring about the changes required to solve the complex, ill-structured problem of building tomorrow's force structure.
19

Conclusion -A Brighter Future
Designing the future U.S. Army is a complex, ill-structured problem that has interlocking issues and constraints, cannot be solved in a traditional linear fashion, evolves as new possible solutions are considered, and includes stakeholders with different views about what constitutes an acceptable solution. After framing this problem using the strategy formulation model, this assessment confirms the TAA process is a robust analytic process that, with slight modifications, can be more effective and efficient. The Army leadership can realize these improvements by requesting concise strategic direction, documenting and communicating resulting risk, encouraging joint interdependence, analytically developing clear priorities, and enhancing relationships with key stakeholders. Strategist Colin Gray contends that "the future is a book with totally blank pages," but he adds that "the strategist confronting the unforeseeable future has to honor two virtues above all others: prudence and adaptability." 44 Without question, the recommendations presented here cannot erase the uncertainty or complexity that today's Army will face, but the architects of change will most certainly continue to exercise prudence and adaptability when designing the future U.S. Army that will always stand ready to fight and win this nation's wars.
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